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independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Body Flap Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a-_roach features a _6p- o_n anal_is of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbiter Body Flap (BF)
subsystem hardware.
The BF is a large aerosurface located at the trailing edge of the
lower aft fuselage of the Orbiter. The proper function of the BF
is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and
entry. During the ascent phase of flight, the BF trails in a
fixed position. For entry, the BF provides elevon load relief,
trim control, and acts as a heat shield for the main engines.
Specifically, the BF hardware comprises the following components:
o Power Drive Unit (PDU)
o Rotary Actuators
o Torque Tubes
l
The IOA analysis process utilized available BF hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
m
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the three major divisions of the BF. A summary of the number
of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with
Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
m
g
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number 3/1R1153/2R
3/38 I TOTAL35
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
m
mm
m
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Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/iNumber : 9
+
2/IR13 2/2_ ] 3/IR7 3/2RI_ TOTAL19
Of the 35 failure modes analyzed, 19 were determined to be PCIs.
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Figure 1 - BODY FLAP OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
intocomponents and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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mStep 4.0 Compare I0A analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 BF Ground Rules and Assumptions
The BF ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION I
The following sections describe the BF actuator system hardware.
This hardware comprises a PDU, rotary actuators, and torque
tubes. An overview of the system components is shown in Figure 2.
3.1 Design and Function
The BF is a large aerosurface at the trailing edge of the lower
aft fuselage of the Orbiter. The proper function of the BF is
essential during the ascent phases of flight. During ascent, the
BF trails in a fixed position. For entry, the BF provides elevon
load relief, trim control, and acts as a main engine heat shield.
The BF system design provides a triple redundancy, electronically
controlled hydro-mechanical drive system. The Flight Control
System (FCS) provides signals to the Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
(ASA) which commands valve packs supplying pressurized fluid to
power hydraulic motors. These motors drive torque tubes which
power rotary actuators and move the BF aerosurface.
The BF PDU comprises three in-line filters, three enable solenoid
valves, six pilot solenoid valves, three power spool assemblies,
one summing link, three hydraulic motor/brake assemblies, and a
PDU geartrain assembly (Figure 3).
Three Orbiter hydraulic loops, each corresponding to an Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU), supply fluid pressure for the BF drive system.
Each PDU is protected by an in-line hydraulic fluid filter up-
stream of the solenoid valves. Nominally, three hydraulic loops
are used to drive the BF. Full BF performance can be maintained
using two hydraulic systems. One hydraulic drive system can
power the BF at full force, but at half rate.
Each enable solenoid valve (Figure 4) controls the flow of
hydraulic fluid to the downstream pilot solenoid valves. These
solenoids contains a normally closed valve. A coll spring
provides the restoring force which maintains a closed valve
position. When energized by an ASA signal, the solenoid provides
a force which overcomes the return spring and allows fluid to
pressurize downstream pilot solenoid valves.
The BF pilot solenoid valves divert hydraulic fluid and pressure
to the downstream control actuator or power spool. The upstream
enable solenoid valve must be opened before hydraulic fluid and
pressure can flow to the pilot solenoid valves. When an up or
down pilot solenoid valve is selected and activated, hydraulic
fluid flows thru the control actuator and rotates the hydraulic
motor in the corresponding direction.
The power spools control£he flow of hydraulic fluid and pressure
to the hydraulic motor/brake assemblies. The power spools are
situated downstream of the hydraulic inlet and the enable/pilot
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Figure 2 - BODY FLAP SYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 - BODY FLAP POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU)
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Figure 4 - BODY FLAP SOLENOIDS AND HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR
9
solenoid valves. The three power spools are mechanically
connected by two summing links. The actuators will translate in
one direction for an up command and in the opposite direction for
a down Command. i_ _
The BF actuator recirculation valve is used to divert hydraulic
fluid around the actuator if system pressure drops below 850 psi.
When hydraulic system pressure is in a nominal range T
(approximately 3000 psi), the recirculation valve is open and
fluid pressurizes the BF actuator.
The st_nming link is designed to mechanically synchronize the
movement of the BF power spools. If one power spool fails to
operate (i.e. jammed solenoid valve, loss of ASA signal, etc.),
one piston is capable of dragging the remaining two systems thru
the summing link to their proper positions. This will direct
hydraulic fluid to the motor/brake assemblies and permit them to
operate nominally.
The hydraulic motor/brake assembly comprises a hydraulic motor
and brake (Figure 5). The hydraulic motor and brake share a
common centerline shaft. Each of three hydraulic motor/brake
assemblies convert 3000 psi fluid pressure to rotary shaft
motion. The assemblies also prevent the differential gearbox
from back-drlving when the systems are unpressurized, _
The hydraulic motor converts hydraulic fluid pressure to rotary
motion of the differential gearbox input torque tubes. The motor
contains a rotating barrel housing multiple pistons. As each
piston passes by the inlet, hydraulic pressure forces each piston
out of the rotary barrel transferring force to the m0tor's fixed
ramp wobble'plate which rotates the §haft. This_sHa_ extends
out of the motor housing into the hydraulic brake portion of the
assembly. _i_..........._ _ _7_i_t x _i _ _ }i_!:_i_i q_
The hydraulic b_ake_is situated between the hydraulic motor and
the differential gearbox input torque tubes. The brake is
normally engaged, preventing the common motor/brake assembly
shaft from rotating or back'driving. When flUid pressure is
diverted to the hydraulic brake, it disengages and the shaft
transmits rotary power to its corresponding torque tube.
The PDU geartrain assembly (Figure 6) comprises three input
torque tubes, a differential gearbox, and one output driveshaft.
The splined input torque tubes transmit rotary shaft power from
the hydraulic motor/brake assembly to the differen%ial gearbox.
The differential gearbox sums the input of three hydraulic motor
torque tubes into one output shaft. The gearbox uses two sets of
planetary gears to sum the torque tube inputs, One driveshaft
transmits the output of the differential gearbox to a beveled
gear. The full performance of the BF can be maintained with two
torque tube inputs. The BF can be driven at half-speed with one
torque tube input.
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Figure 5 - HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY
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Figure 6 - BODY FLAP DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX AND ROTARY ACTUATORS
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The PDU geartrain assembly contains two 35-watt heaters mounted
to the gearbox. These heaters are used when the vehicle's
attitude is thermally cold.
The PDU geartrain assembly output driveshaft position is measured
by a four Rotary Variable Differential Transformers (RVDTs)
mounted on a common bracket. Any one of the four RVDTs is
capable of measuring the driveshaft position. ASA channel four
receives the RVDTs output and transmits them to the GPCs for
determining BF position.
The rotary actuators (Figure 7) connect the BF to the Orbiter and
provide the hinge-moment required to move the surface up or
down. The rotary actuators receive torque and power from four
torque tubes (Figure 8) connected to the beveled gear at the PDU
gearbox driveshaft.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The BF system hardware is located at the trailing edge of the
Orbiter's lower fuselage. The BF system interfaces with the
Orbiter's three hydraulic systems (each corresponding to one
APU). The BF system hardware interfaces with the ASAs which in
turn interface with the FCS portion of the GPCs for system
control actuation and feedback.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the BF hardware components.
Figures 3 through 8 depict the functional details of the BF
system components.
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Figure 7 - GEARED ROTARY ACTUATOR
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
PDU
Rotary Act.
Torque Tubes
TOTAL
I/i
7
1
1
2/IR
3
2/2
m
u
3/IR
15
15
3/2R
I
w
3/3 TOTAL
8 33
- 1
- 1
8 35
4
g
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D
D
Of these 35 failure modes analyzed, 19 were determined to be
PCIs. A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix
D contains a cross reference between each PCI and analysis work-
sheets in Appendix C.
4 +
mm
mm
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
1/1 2/2 3/2R TOTALCriticality:
PDU
Rotary Act.
Torque Tubes
7
1
1
2/IR
3 w
m
3/IR
7 w 17
1
1
191 31-1 v ! - I 191
4-
I TOTAL
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4.1 Power Drive Unit
Critical failures of the PDU components can be caused by:
plugged filters, jammed or failed control valves, Jammed or
fractured summing links, plugged supply orifices, failed or
fractured hydraulic motor/brake assemblies, and fractured or
Jammed differential gears and shafts.
m
i
g
m
g
16
I
mm
=w
m
m
__1
U
w
w
L_
J
E_
w
4.2 Geared Rotary Actuator
Critical failure modes of the geared rotary actuator can be
caused by: a fractured or open shaft, and a fractured or open
gear within the rotary actuator.
4.3 Torque Tubes
Critical failure modes of the torque tubes can be caused by a
fractured or open torque tube.
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ASSY
BF
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FCS
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FMEA
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HYD
HW
IOA
MDAC
MTR
NA
NASA
NSTS
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PDU
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Assembly
- Body Flap
- Brake
- Critical Items List
- Functional
- Flight Control System
- Failure Mode
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- General Purpose Computer
- Hydraulic, Hydraulics
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Motor
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Potential Critical Item
- Power Drive Unit
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
- Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
.- Rockwell International
- valve
- Transducer
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the _6_lowing
and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
%-60PS 9, post-flight
La - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsi£ion_o OPS 9, pos_tlf-iigh_ _ i_!_" _ =
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
%-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where muitipie failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p--_ed end of m_sslon
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or even-_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transiti_ out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at ra_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for _I_:_L>
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00--_ober 1986, was employed----with the
following amp--[ifications a-nd additio_
1. The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
........... this task ....
o After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
• Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
: : :i:-:!i!;_
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings•
,
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
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B.3 BF-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
None.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
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This section contains the I0A analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at-_he
_6_t_of-_ach sheet', and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalitles:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(iike or Unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR -Redundan_£-_ardware items (like or unlike) ail of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: i01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ENAB_ SOLENOID VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP .....
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES ....
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE LEAKS PAST SOLENOID VALVE AND DOWNSTREAM SOLENOIDS ARE
CONTINUOUSLY PRESSURIZED; NOMINAL SYSTEM FUNCTION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/nmC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: LOSS OF ASA CHANNEL
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ : ....
SYSTEM CANNOT BE ACTIVATED; REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS OPERATE BODY
FLAP NOMINALLY.
REFERENCES:
w
r
i
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12:45 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY F_P
103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
ENAB_ SO_NOID VALVE
F_C_D HOUSING
_AD _ALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) BODY F_P
2) ENABT._. SOT._NOID VALVE
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEO_IT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER:
_T _SE_GE
MC621-0056-0053
_USES: FATIGUE, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._.:
SYSTEM P_SS_E DE_YS, HYD_ULIC B_ ENGAGES, _CIRCU_TION
VALVE OPEN DIVERTING F_W TO__; SYSTEM OPE_TES NOMINALLY ON
_O SYSTEMS.
_FE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
S/IR
S/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/iR
3/1R
3/1R
c[P]
CAUSES: LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM PRESSURE DECAYS, HYDRAULIC BRAKE ENGAGES, RECIRCULATION
VALVE OPEN DIVERTING FLOW TO RETURN; SYSTEM OPERATES NOMINALLY ON
TWO SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 105 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J, RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
s)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE PLOT SOLENOID VALVE REMAINS OPEN; OPPOSITE DIRECTION PILOT
VALVE IS SELECTED PRESSURIZING BOTH SIDES OF DOWNSTREAM CONTROL
VALVE. SUMMING LINK DRAGS POWER SPOOL TO PROPER POSITION.
SYSTEM OPERATES NOMINALLY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCI0 SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/iR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: LOSS OF ASA CHANNEL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM CANNOT BE ACTIVATED; REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS OPERATE BODY
FLAP NOMINALLY. ......
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
FRACTURED HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: FATIGUE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM PRESSURES DECAYS, HYDRAULIC BRAKE ENGAGES, RECIRCULATION
VALVE OPENS DIVERTING FLOW TO RETURN; SYSTEM OPERATES NOMINALLY
ON TWO SYSTEMS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
T)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: /NA AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM PRESSURES DECAYS, HYDRAULIC BRAKE ENGAGES, RECIRCULATION
VALVE OPENS DIVERTING FLOW TO RETURN; BF OPERATES NOMINALLY ON
TWO SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12 :45 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS NULL POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: LOSS OF ASA CHANNEL, GROSS FLUID LEAKAGE, LOSS OF SYSTEM
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS DRAG ACTUATOR WITH SUMMING LINK-NOMINAL
SYSTEM OPERATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: ii0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO RETURN
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: BROKEN RETURN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS DRAG ACTUATOR WITH SUMMING LINK-NOMINAL
SYSTEM OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
i
=
m
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: iii
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/l
ITEM: ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, OVER-TEMPERATUREACTUATOR
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: ....
REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS CANNOT OVERCOME JAMMED VALVE; LOSS OF BODY
FLAP MOTION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIG_:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAI_ OPEN
_AD _ALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS _AD: J. RICCIO
B_DO_ HIE_C_:
1) BODY FLAP
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ENABT._. SOLENOID VALVE
PI_T SOT._NOID VALVE
PO_R SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_TION:
P_T_MBER:
AFT _SELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
_USES: CONT_IN_ IN SYSTEM, SPRING B_ OR _ES
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
SYSTEM OPE_TES NO.ALLY ON _0 SYSTEMS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
_FE_NCES:
i
i
E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
ll3
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
RECIRCULATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, GROSS FLUID LEAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILS CLOSED-ACTUATORRECEIVES PRESSURE <800 PSIG, AND MOVES AT
REDUCED RATE. REMAINING SYSTEMS DRAG PISTON THROUGH SUMMING
LINK. FULL SYSTEM CAPABILITY. FAILS CLOSED-PRESSURE SPILLS TO
RETURN; SUMMING LINK DRAGS ACTUATOR AND HYDRAULIC MOTOR OPERATES
NORMALLY. LEAK-PRESSURE DECAYS, HYDRAULIC BRAKE ENGAGES, AND
RECIRCULATION VALVE OPENS. SUMMING LINK DRAGS ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM: SUMMING LINK
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
SUMMING LINK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINATION JAMS SUMMING LINK-LOSS OF ALL BODY FLAP MOTION AND
CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FI_P
115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMMING LINK
FRACTURED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
SUMMING LINK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE LINK-ARM OR LINK-END FRACTURES, REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS DRIVE
THE BODY FLAPS. NO PERFORMANCE DEGREDATION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
SUMMING LINK
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: GROSS FLUID LEAKAGE, LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE, MOTOR
BEARING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
HYDRAULIC MOTOR DOES NOT PRODUCE TORQUE/SHAFT OUTPUT; REMAINING
TWO LOOPS DRIVE BF NOMINALLY. PRESSURE DECAYS BELOW 850 PSI,
ISO-VALVE OPENS, AND REMAINING LOOP PRESSURE BYPASSES CONTROL
VALVE ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12:45 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_C
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
HYD_ULIC MOTOR
F_C_D S_FT
LEAD _ALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS _AD: J. RICCIO
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
?)
s)
9)
BODY FLAP
__ SO_NOID VALVE
PI_T SOLENOID VALVE
PO_R SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
suMMING LiNK
HYD_ULIC MOTOR/B_KE ASSEMBLY
HYD_ULIC MOTOR
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBI T: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
AFT _SE_GE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/_TIONAT,_.:
S_FT SH_; _SS OF TORQUE/S_FT OUTPUT. SYSTEM MUST BE
ISO_TED _D HYD_ULIC B_ APPLIED TO P_VE_ TORQUE SPILL-OUT
FROM DIFFE_NTIAL GE_BOX._ ................... r
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/16/B6
BODY FLAP
118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
FAILS TO BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
SUMMING LINK
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: GROSS FLUID LEAKAGE; LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE; BROKEN
RETURN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYDRAULIC: p_SSU!_ IS _REQUIRED TO DISENGAGE BRAKE. FAILED BRAKE
DOES NOT PP_VENT TORQUE SPILL-OUT FROM DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX.
TORQUE SPILL-OUT IS PREVENTED BY A POWERED HYDRAULIC MOTOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12:45 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FI_P
119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/!R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
FRACTURED SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
SUMMING LINK
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHAFT FRACTURES INTERNAL TO BRAKE HOUSING-HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS MUST
BE SHUT-DOWN TO DETECT FAILED UNIT AND ENGAGE BRAKE TO PREVENT
TORQUE SPILL-OUT. REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS DRIVE BODY FLAP
NOMINALLY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
FRACTURED GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
8) DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTO FF: 3/ 3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FRACTURED GEAR JAMS GEARBOX OR PREVENTS TRANSMISSION OF POWER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12:45 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED GEARS (ONE SET)
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
8) DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: FRACTURED GEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE SET OF DIFFERENTIAL GEARS JAM; TWO INPUT SHAFTS DRIVE
REMAINING DIFFERENTIAL AT FULL CAPACITY AND RATE.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
JAMMED INPUT SHAFT (ONE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
8) DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
B[F] C [ P]
CAUSES: FRACTURED GEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHAFT JAMS; REMAINING TWO INPUTS DRIVE SYSTEM NOMINALLY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
J
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVESHAFT
JAMMED OUTPUT SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
8) DRIVESHAFT
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
C [NA ]
CAUSES: DRIVESHAFT BEARING SEIZED, BROKEN GEAR TOOTH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JAMMED SHAFT PREVENTS BODY FLAP MOTION-LOSS OF BF CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/!
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PDU GEARBOX HEATER
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
8) PDU GEARBOX HEATER
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: THERMOSTAT STUCK-ON.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN DISABLE HEATER, PDU GEARBOX DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND
OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12:45 C-25
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
BODY FLAP
126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PDU GEARBOX HEATER
ERRONEOUS SENSOR READING
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
8) PDU GEARBOX HEATER
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CAT!ON:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: THERMOSTAT FAILS TO OPERATE PROPERLY.
EFFECtS/RATIONALE:
PDU GEARBOX HEATERS AR_ NOT DETRIMENTALTO GEARBOX USE.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PDU GEARBOX HEATER
BROKEN LEAD WIRE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
8) PDU GEARBOX HEATER
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANT HEATER OPERATES SYSTEM WITHIN NOMINAL TOLERANCES.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DAn:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY F_P
128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
RVDT (4-_ITS)
_SS OF ONE SIGNAL
LEAD _ALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
I) BODY F_P
2) ENABT._. SOT,_NOID VALVE
3) PI_T SO_NOID VALVE
4) PO_R S_OL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYD_ULIC MOTOR/B_ ASSY
7) PDU GE_T_IN ASSY
8) RVDT
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [P]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
A_ _SE_GE
MC621-0056-0053
_USES: SHOCK, VIB_TION, BROWN 7_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONAT_:
_Y OF T_ FO_ RVDTs C_ FEEDBACK T_ BODY F_P POSITION-NO
PERFORM_CE DEG_TION.
_FE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: ROTARY ACTUATORS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY
6) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
7) TORQUE TUBE
8) ROTARY ACTUATOR
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: GEARS JAM, GEARS CRACK OR BREAK, BEARING SEIZES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BODY FLAP MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12:45 C-29
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86
BODY FLAP
130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE TUBE (FOR ROTARY ACTUATORS)
FRACTURED SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSY ......
PDU GEARTRAIN ASSY
TORQUE TUBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: i/i ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
1/1
1/1
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: MISMATCHED LOADS, FATIGUE, JAMMED ROTARY ACTUATOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BODY FLAP MOTION.
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: HYDRAULIC BRAKE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
SUMMING LINK
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FU_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE IS REQUIRED TO DISENGAGE BRAKE. CONTAMINATION
PREVENTS BRAKE FROM DISENGAGING. SYSTEM DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE
MOTION AND TORQUE TO DIFFERENTIAL. REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS DRIVE
BF NOMINALLY.
REFERENCES:
m
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FILTER
FAILURE MODE: PLUGGED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) BODY FLAP
2) FILTER
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE
PLUGGED FILTER DECREASES HYDRAULIC PRESSURE TO PDU.
RECIRCULATION VALVE OPEN DIVERTING FLUID TORETURN LINE. BF
OPERATES NOMINALLY ON TWO SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/I
ITEM: SUPPLY ORIFICE #i
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
SUPPLY ORIFICE #1
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
/NA AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
I/i
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC FLUID
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ENABLE AND PILOT VALVES OPEN ALLOWING HYDRAULIC FLUID TO RELEASE
B_ HOWEVER, ORIFICE IS PLUGGED AND FLUID CANNOT DRIVE MOTOR.
TORQUE FROM TWO REMAINING SYSTEMS SPILLS-OUT OF MOTOR. SYSTEMS
MUST BE SHUT-DOWNTO DETECT FAILED PDU.
E_
REFERENCES:
rE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86
BODY FLAP
134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE #2
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
ORIFICE #2
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
/NA AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC FLUID
EFFECTS/RATION_ _L_ _j ....... _.......__.
ENABLE AND PILOT SOLENOIDS OPEN ALLOWING FLUID TO TRANSLATE
ACTUATOR - CONTROL VALVE. ORIFICE IS PLUGGED, ACTUATOR - CONTROL
VALVE TRANSLATES FASTER THAN THE TWO REMAINING SYSTEMS. NORMAL
BODY FLAP OPERATION.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/2o/86
BODY FLAP
135
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORIFICE #3
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
ORIFICE #3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC FLUID
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ENABLE AND PILOT SOLENOIDS OPEN ALLOWING FLUID TO TRANSLATE
ACTUATOR - CONTROL VALVE. ORIFICE IS PLUGGED, ACTUATOR - CONTROL
VALVE TRANSLATES FASTER THAN THE TWO REMAINING SYSTEMS. NORMAL
BODY FLAP OPERATION.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
z/1
1/1
ITEM: RVDT
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BODY FLAP
2) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4) POWER SPOOL - CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY
7) PDU GEARTRAIN ASSEMBLY
8) RVDT
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE H=DW/FUN C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: VIBRATION CAUSES BROKEN BRACKET
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
IF BRACKET SUPPORTING ALL RVDTs FRACTURES, THE BODY FLAP POSITION
CAN NOT BE DETERMINED.
REFERENCES:
m
l
m
mm
i
im
m
l
mm
m
m
g
D
i
i
M
w
m
REPORT DATE 11/19/86 12:45 C-36
J
g
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
E
E
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MDAC ID
109
ii0
Iii
i14
115
116
i17
118
119
121
122
123
124
129
130
131
132
133
136
ITEM
Actuator control valve
Actuator control valve
Actuator control valve
Summing link
Summing link
Hydraulic motor
Hydraulic motor
Hydraulic brake
Hydraulic brake
Differential gearbox
Differential gearbox
Differential gearbox
Driveshaft
Rotary actuator
Torque tube
Hydraulic brake
Filter
Supply orifice #i
RVDT
FAILURE MODE
Fails null position
Fails to return
Jammed
Jammed
Fractured
Fails to start
Fractured shaft
Fails to brake
Fractured shaft
Fractured gear
Jammed gear
Jammed shaft
Jammed
Fails to start
Fractured
Fails to disingage
Plugged
Fails closed
Loss of signal
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